In 2015, Tso et al.'s demonstrated that Guo and Chang's password authentication scheme could not achieve the user anonymity property, and do not allow changing password freely for the user. Then, they proposed a new method to remedy the weaknesses. However, this paper points out that Tso et al.'s scheme is still vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack and denial of service attack using stolen smart card unlike their claims. For this reason, Tso et al.'s scheme is insecure for practical application.
Introduction
The smart card based authentication scheme is becoming more and more important and functional because of the cryptographic capacity, low cost, and the portability. There are many remote user authentication protocols with smart card being proposed to improve security, efficiency, and functionality extensively by many scholars in recent years [1, 2, 3] .
In 2013, Guo and Chang [3] firstly proposed password-authenticated key agreement protocol using smart card based on Chebyshev chaotic maps [1, 2, 3, 4] . In 2015. Tso et al. [4] , however, demonstrated that Guo and Chang's scheme is still vulnerable to the impersonation attack by using data extracted from his/her own smart card, and cannot provide changing password freely for the user and the user anonymity. However, this paper points out that Tso et al.'s scheme is also still vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack and denial of service attack using stolen smart card unlike their claims [5] . For this reason, Tso et al.'s scheme is insecure for practical application.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We review Tso et al.'s password authentication scheme in Section 2. The attacks on the Tso et al.'s scheme are presented in Section 3. Finally, we draw some conclusions in Section 4.
Review of Tso et al.'s Password Authentication Scheme
In 2015, Tso et al. [4] analyzed the weaknesses of the Guo and Chang's scheme, and then presented a more secure user authentication protocol based on Chebyshev chaotic maps [1, 2, 3] . In the initialization, the server S chooses two secret key s and d, where s and d are large numbers. And h(·) is a secure one-way hash function with fixed-length output. Tso et al.'s scheme consists of three phases: the registration, the authentication, and the updated password.
Registration phase
If the user U i with identity ID i would like to register or re-register with the server S, U i and S perform the following steps:
1. U i selects a password pw i and a random number b i and then computes h(pw i ||b i ).
2. U i submits his/her identity ID i and h(pw i ||b i ) to S for registration over a secure channel.
3. If ID i is valid, S computes the followings:
4. S stores the data {h(·), V i , T s (x i )} into a new smart card, and then issues the smart card to U i through a secure channel.
5. U i stores the random number b i into the smart card. If U i wants to log into S, then U i and S will perform the following steps:
U i first inserts his/her smart card into a card reader and inputs the ID i and password pw i . Then, the smart card selects a random number u and computes the followings:
Finally, the smart card sends the message
to S, where T 1 is the current timestamp of the smart card.
where T * is the time of receiving the login message and ∆T is the time threshold. Then, S with his/her secret keys s and d computes the followings:
Next, S computes
and then checks whether
If the verification is false, S terminates this login request for a period of time. If the verification is successful, S believes that the user U i is valid. S selects a random number v and computes the followings:
Finally, S sends the message {T 2 , T v (x i ), R i } to U i , where T 2 is S's current timestamp of the system. 3. After receiving {T 2 , T v (x i ), R i }, the smart card compares whether the time T 2 is acceptable. Then, the smart card computes the followings:
and compares whether R i ? = R i . If the equation holds, S is authenticated by U i .
After finishing the authentication phase, both U i and S compute the common session key
Updated password phase
When U i wants to change his/her password pw i with a new password pw . Then, the smart card computes
2. U i replaces V i with V i on the memory of the smart card.
Cryptanalysis of Tso et al.'s Password Authentication Scheme
This section demonstrates that Tso et al.'s password authentication scheme [4] is still vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack, smart card loss attack, and does not preserve anonymity of user unlike its claims. The details of these flaws are described as follows.
Off-line password guessing attack
Suppose that the user U i 's smart card is lost or stolen, then the attacker Eve can extract the stored secret information {h(·), V i , T s (x i ), b i } stored in the smart card. Moreover, let us assume that an attacker Eve has intercepted one of the U i 's past login request messages, i.e., {CID i , T u (h (ID i ||d) ), Y i , T 1 )}. Then Eve can perform an off-line password guessing attack to obtain the password pw i of U i as follows:
1. Eve selects a candidate password pw * i .
Eve checks if the following equation holds or not
If the check passes, then Eve confirms that the guessed password pw * i is the correct one.
3. If it is not correct, Eve chooses another password pw * * i and repeatedly performs above step (2) until
It is clear that if
Therefore, Tso et al.'s authentication scheme is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack. The algorithm of the off-line password guessing attack for getting the password pw * i is as follows:
The running time of the above password guessing attack is (O(|D pw |)×3T c × T x × 2T h ), where T c , T x and T h represent the execution time of concatenation, bit-wise XOR operations, and hash operations respectively. The search spaces D P W is unlikely to be large enough (for example, |D P W | ≤ 10 6 ), and the time complexities T c , T h and T x all can be executed with negligible amount of time, thus the polynomial time-bounded adversary Eve can find the exact password pw i of U i easily [6, 7] . 
3. The smart card will replace V i in smart card in place of V i without any checking.
If malicious user stole the user U i 's smart card for a short time and change arbitrary new password like above mentioned attack, then the legal user U i 's succeeding login requests will be denied unless he/she re-registers to remote system again because Y i ? = Y i in authentication phase. Therefore, Tso et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to the denial of service attack using stolen smart card [5] .
Conclusions
This paper reviewed Tso et al.'s password authentication scheme based on Chebyshev chaotic maps and then pointed out that Tso et al.'s scheme is still vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack and denial of service attack using stolen smart card unlike their claims. For this reason, Tso et al.'s scheme is insecure for practical application. Further works will be focused on improving the Tso et al.'s scheme which can be able to provide greater security and to be more efficient than the existing smart card-based remote user authentication schemes using Chebyshev chaotic maps by an accurate performance analysis.
